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Abstract
We study how workers’ wages respond to TFP-driven innovations in ﬁrms’
labor productivity. Using unique data with highly reliable ﬁrm-level output
prices and quantities in the manufacturing sector in Sweden, we are able to
derive measures of physical (as opposed to revenue) TFP to instrument labor
productivity in the wage equations. We ﬁnd that the reaction of wages to
sectoral labor productivity is almost three times larger than the response to
pure idiosyncratic (ﬁrm-level) shocks, a result which crucially hinges on the use
of physical TFP as an instrument. These results are all robust to a number
of empirical speciﬁcations, including models accounting for selection on both
the demand and supply side through worker-ﬁrm (match) ﬁxed eﬀects. Further
results suggest that technological progress at the ﬁrm level has negligible eﬀects
on the ﬁrm-level composition of employees.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
There is a long-standing debate on the importance of ﬁrm-level productivity for
individual wages. Building on the extensive literature that followed the work by
Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999), it is by now an established fact that some
ﬁrms consistently pay higher wages than others, even to identical workers. Yet,
surprisingly little is known about the deep determinants of the persistent diﬀer-
ences in ﬁrms’ pay, and about how these diﬀerences evolve when ﬁrms’ economic
conditions change.1 Mortensen (2003) argued that productivity diﬀerences between
ﬁrms are closely linked to wage dispersion, and the association between measured
labor productivity and individual wages is by now also well documented (Lentz and
Mortensen (2010)). However, identifying the direction of causality is not straightfor-
ward and, as we argue in this paper, standard identiﬁcation problems are typically
exacerbated by a lack of adequate data on the ﬁrm side.2
Assessing the causal impact of ﬁrm-level productivity on individual workers’
wages poses three key identiﬁcation challenges. The ﬁrst is a measurement issue.
Since ﬁrm-level prices rarely are observed, most previous studies measure ﬁrm-level
output as revenue divided by an industry-level deﬂator. This implies that output
and productivity measures reﬂect price diﬀerences between ﬁrms operating in the
1A large literature has established an empirical association between wages and ﬁrm level proﬁts.
See Nickell and Wadhwani (1990), Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1996) and Hildreth and Oswald (1997)
for some of the earlier work and Martins (2009), Arai and Heyman (2009) and Card, Devicienti,
and Maida (2009) for recent applications. Diﬀerences in proﬁts across ﬁrms, just like the case of
revenue or sales discussed in the paper, are likely to be driven by demand, productivity and factor
input shocks.
2Fox and Smeets (Forthcoming) and Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Ulltveit-Moe (2009) have recently
looked at the reverse of our question of interest: the impact of unobserved human capital charac-
teristics on productivity diﬀerences across ﬁrms within sectors.
2same industry. Importantly, ﬁrm-level prices tend to be a function of factor prices,
including wages (see e.g. Carlsson and Nordström Skans (Forthcoming)). In order
to diﬀerentiate between ﬁrms with high costs (e.g. due to high wages) and ﬁrms with
high productivity it is therefore necessary to account for price diﬀerences between
ﬁrms within industries. When assessing the impact of ﬁrm productivity on wages,
measures of productivity based on ﬁrm-level revenues deﬂated by an industry-level
price index will suﬀer from reversed causality.
The second challenge stems from ﬁrms’ optimizing behavior, which generates
a relationship between wages and labor productivity that diﬀers from the causal
impact of productivity on wages we want to capture. Intuitively, shocks to wages,
other factor prices or product demand will alter the scale of production and/or
the capital-labor ratio as well as individual wages. A positive association between
wages and productivity may arise if labor productivity responds to idiosyncratic
ﬁrm-level wage shocks. Think about a positive wage shock. Firms’ optimizing
behavior suggests a substitution of labor for capital, which should increase labor
productivity. Sometimes this relationshipm a yb et r i g g e r e db yo t h e rs h o c k sw h i c h
are not easily observed by the econometrician. In a context of decreasing returns
to scale, a positive demand shock that results in an upscale of production reduces
labor productivity. If the local labor supply is upward sloping, the increase in the
demand for labor will push up wages, resulting in a spurious negative association
between labor productivity and wages.
The ﬁnal challenge is associated with worker sorting. More able workers may
move from less productive to more productive ﬁrms, if the latter pay higher wages.
In addition, poor matches between workers and ﬁrms may dissolve when ﬁrm pro-
ductivity declines. Hence, assessing the causal impact of productivity on individual
3wages requires that sorting is properly accounted for.
This paper studies the response of workers’ individual wages to ﬁrm-level pro-
ductivity. Our empirical strategy exploits unique features of our data to overcome
the three challenges previously discussed. We draw on a very rich matched employer-
employee panel data set of the manufacturing sector in Sweden. A crucial feature
of our data is that, on top of having detailed information on worker and establish-
ment characteristics, we are able to access highly reliable ﬁrm-level price indices
for the compound of goods that each of the ﬁrms sells.3 T h i sh e l p su sd e a lw i t h
the ﬁrst problem outlined above. We use ﬁrm-level prices to construct proper labor
productivity measures, which are clean from movements in relative prices across
ﬁrms within sectors. To overcome the likely endogeneity of labor productivity in
the wage regressions, we instrument labor productivity with physical total factor
productivity (TFP), which is measured at the ﬁrm level following a production
function approach.4 Since an appropriately measured TFP isolates shifts in the
production function from movements along the production function, we thereby ob-
tain an exogenous instrument for labor productivity that allows us to estimate the
causal impact of productivity on wages. In order to deal with worker sorting, we
exploit the matched employer-employee nature of our panel and estimate models
with employer by employee ﬁxed eﬀects. This implies that inference is made from
time-varying ﬁrm-level productivity for ongoing matched worker-ﬁrm pairs, which
eﬀectively allows us to abstract from both assortative matching and endogenous
3Our sample is composed of single establishment ﬁrms. Hence, we use the terms establishment
and ﬁrm interchangeably in the paper.
4I nt h ep a p e r ,w ew i l lu s et h et e r mp h y s i c a lT F Pw h e nw ed e ﬂate the ﬁrm level output series
with ﬁrm level price indices, as opposed to revenue-based TFP, which is based on sectoral deﬂated
output. However, in a strict sense we are not measuring physical output units of a homogeneous
good, as in Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008).
4match quality.
Empirically, our paper is most closely related to Guiso, Schivardi, and Pistaferri
(2005), which uses Italian data to show that transitory shocks in ﬁrms’ sales are not
transmitted into workers’ wages, while permanent shocks are not fully transferred.
Thus, ﬁrms appear to provide partial insurance to workers, in the spirit of Azariadis
(1975). An alternative interpretation is that ﬁrms share rents with their workers, a
point also made in the replication study on Portuguese data by Cardoso and Portela
(2009). Obviously, changes in ﬁrms’ sales are inﬂuenced by productivity shocks,
demand shocks, shocks to wages and shocks to other factor-prices, and these shocks
may inﬂuence wage setting in varying degrees. We take a more narrow approach
and aim to isolate the eﬀects of technology-driven movements in labor productivity
on individual wages, once ﬁrm and worker heterogeneity have been accounted for.
Importantly, our paper is silent about the role of wage contracts as an insurance
mechanism, since the statistical properties of the TFP series we use to instrument
labor productivity suggest that the technology shocks we capture are of a permanent
nature.
We allow for shocks to ﬁrm productivity to diﬀer in their wage impact depending
on whether the shocks are purely idiosyncratic or if they are shared with other similar
ﬁrms. This has two motivations. The ﬁrst is that the outside options of workers, or
competing bids, are likely to be aﬀected by productivity shocks if these shocks are
shared with other ﬁrms operating in the sector. The second motivation is the fact
that an important element of wage bargaining in most OECD countries (including
Sweden) takes place at a level higher than the ﬁrm; either at the sector or aggregate
level. In this context, it is crucial to understand how purely idiosyncratic shocks are
transmitted into wages and how the eﬀects of these shocks diﬀer from shocks that
5are shared within a larger bargaining unit.
To preview our results, we show that wages are causally aﬀected by changes in
both idiosyncratic ﬁrm-level productivity and sectoral productivity. The elasticity
of wages to shocks that are shared within a narrow (bargaining) sector is about three
times larger than the elasticity with respect to purely idiosyncratic shocks. However,
since the variance of idiosyncratic productivity is higher than the variance of sectoral
productivity, the actual estimated impact on wages is about the same. We ﬁnd that
an increase of one (within match) standard deviation of either productivity measure
(sector or idiosyncratic) raises wages of incumbent workers by about one quarter of
the average yearly wage growth.
We also document that the measurement issues discussed above are quantita-
tively important. Deﬂating revenues with 3-digit producer price indices instead of
using ﬁrm-level prices gives estimates of idiosyncratic productivity that are almost
twice as large as our baseline estimates. Accounting for the endogeneity of labor
productivity also proved to be crucial. The impact of sectoral shocks is vastly un-
derstated unless labor productivity is instrumented with a properly identiﬁed TFP
measure. As suggested by theory, the diﬀerence between OLS and IV estimates
appears to be due to endogenous adjustments in the part of the economy where
returns to scale are decreasing.
Perhaps surprisingly, we ﬁnd that accounting for match quality has a relatively
minor impact on our results. To investigate this further, we assess how the average
quality of the ﬁrm’s labor force is aﬀected by ﬁrm-level productivity shocks. We
proceed in two steps. First, we estimate worker ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) for the whole
economy in the six years that precede the period of our main analysis. Then, we
relate sectoral and idiosyncratic ﬁrm-level shocks to these (pre-dated) worker FE in
6each of the manufacturing ﬁrms of our sample. Our results show that the quality of
the typical ﬁrm’s workforce is largely unaﬀected by changes in its productivity, sug-
gesting that there is little assortative matching between workers’ previous portable
earnings capacity and the time-varying productivity of ﬁrms and sectors. Given that
the shocks we analyze appear to be permanent in nature, this result appears to be
at odds with models of worker-ﬁrm sorting (e.g. Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin
(2006) or Lentz and Mortensen (2010)). An alternative interpretation is, however,
that the personnel policies of ﬁrms are predetermined and change infrequently. In
line with this interpretation, Haltiwanger, Lane, and Spletzer (1999) ﬁnd in matched
employer-employee data for the US that while the skill distribution within estab-
lishments is tightly linked to the average sales per worker, there is virtually no
relationship between changes in productivity and changes in the worker mix.
Our main results imply that the productivity component shared with other ﬁrms
within narrowly deﬁned sectors has a larger impact on individual wages than the
productivity within the own ﬁrm, suggesting that it is crucial to account for the
interdependency between ﬁrms when assessing the links between ﬁrm productivity
and workers’ wages. We also provide tentative results suggesting that about half
of the diﬀerence between purely idiosyncratic shocks and sectoral shocks can be
accounted for by changes in the outside option of workers (and hence the reservation
wage) and conjecture that the other half most likely is related to the structure of
wage bargaining in Sweden.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First we present our empirical
strategy in Section 2. In particular, we discuss in this section the likely endogeneity
of labor productivity in the wage regressions, and the advantages and pitfalls of
using diﬀerent TFP series as an instrument. Details on the construction of the data
7are provided in Section 3. The empirical results in the paper are presented in Section
4 and Section 5 concludes.
2M e t h o d
This section is divided into two parts. First, we outline our estimated wage equa-
tion, discussing the diﬀerent identiﬁcation challenges that arise in the attempt to
interpret the impact of labor productivity on wages as a causal relationship. We
stress the potential importance of selection, the endogeneity of labor productivity
and the virtues of using physical TFP as an instrument. Then, we describe the esti-
mation strategy to derive physical TFP, and discuss the importance of obtaining an
appropriately deﬁned physical TFP series in order for TFP to be a valid instrument
for labor productivity.
2.1 Estimating the wage impact of productivity
Conceptually we start from a model of wage setting which allows the wages of workers
to depend on individual productivity (human capital), ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity, and
local labor market conditions. All factors are allowed to be time-varying. Formally,
 = (  ) (1)
where  is the log wage of worker ,w o r k i n gf o rﬁrm  at time ,a n d denotes the
log of labor productivity (ln()). Moreover,  denotes the tightness (vacan-
cies/unemployed) of the local labor market  to which ﬁrm  belongs. Worker human
capital is represented by the vector  (including measures of gender, immigration
status, education, age and tenure) and  is a measure of other factors aﬀecting
wages (treated as noise).
8The speciﬁcation (1) is general enough to comprise the predictions of most wage-
setting models. It is evident that a spot labor market without frictions or bargaining
leaves no role for ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity to aﬀect wages, once local labor mar-
ket conditions have been accounted for. In contrast, wage bargaining models or
models featuring search and matching frictions predict a positive eﬀect from ﬁrm
productivity on wages. In this context, the structure of wage bargaining is likely to
be important. If wage negotiations between worker and employer associations take
place at a sectoral level, productivity developments that are shared within sectors
are likely to have a diﬀerent impact on wages than purely idiosyncratic productivity.
Wage negotiations in Sweden during our period of study were characterized by
sectoral bargaining with an important presence of ﬁrm-level wage drift (see Appendix
A). Hence, in the analysis we allow for both idiosyncratic and sector productivity to
have an impact on wages. Conceptually, we can think of a two-stage, reduced-form
model where sectoral wages () are set according to the average productivity in
the sector (
 ). Thereafter, ﬁrm-level wages () are determined by the ﬁrms’
idiosyncratic deviations from the sectoral means ( − 
 ). In order to account
for other factors, we may allow for common time eﬀects (), time-invariant sector
speciﬁc( )a n dﬁrm-speciﬁc( )e ﬀects, and local labor market tightness (()).
In (log) linear form:
 = 
 1 +  +  + 
 =  +(  − 
 )2 + () +  +  (2)
The system naturally decomposes movements in labor productivity into a sec-
toral and a ﬁrm-speciﬁc component with potentially diﬀerent eﬀects on wages. In
order to arrive at the empirical speciﬁcation which we estimate on worker-level wage
9data, we add individual characteristics () and allow the ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect
to vary over individuals. Using the notation 
 for the ﬁrm’s purely idiosyncratic
productivity component (i.e., 
 =  − 




2 + () +  +  +  +  (3)
our parameters of interest being 1 and 2, which measure the responses of wages to
sectoral (
) and idiosyncratic labor productivity (
), respectively. Note that the
match-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect () also captures all sector and ﬁrm-level ﬁxed factors.
We estimate diﬀerent versions of this model with diﬀerent sets of control variables,
for various subsamples, and we also let the eﬀects of productivity vary across diﬀerent
types of ﬁrms and workers.
All our speciﬁcations include time eﬀects, time-varying individual characteristics
and labor market tightness at the local labor market. Similarly, we always include
ﬁrm- (or match-) level ﬁxed eﬀects, since the TFP series we use to instrument la-
bor productivity are derived from integrated ﬁrm-level changes, which produce an
unknown constant for each ﬁrm (see details below). Firm eﬀects also take care of
any ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristic that remains constant over the period of observation,
helping to eliminate possible omitted variable biases at the ﬁrm level. For instance,
good working conditions may have a positive impact on ﬁrm-level productivity, while
at the same time these amenities would have a negative impact on wages if com-
pensating wage diﬀerentials are important.5 This would then introduce a downward
bias in our estimates of productivity on wages. To the extent that working condi-
tions and other amenities do not change in the short period of time we are studying,
they would be captured by the ﬁrm-level ﬁxed eﬀects.
5See Daniel and Sofer (1998) for a discussion.
10Worker ﬁxed eﬀects eliminate possible composition biases associated with sys-
tematic changes in the labor force of the ﬁrm that are unobservable to the econome-
trician. For instance, if high productivity ﬁrms tend to attract high ability workers,
and high ability workers are paid higher wages, our estimates of the eﬀects of produc-
tivity might be upwardly biased without individual ﬁxed eﬀects. The simultaneous
account for worker and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects therefore eliminate possible biases from
sorting on either side of the market, but the average quality of retained matches can
also change as a consequence of changes in productivity. For instance, poor matches
may be the ﬁrst to be dissolved in response to negative productivity shocks. In this
case, what we interpret as the eﬀects of productivity on wages might be driven by
the sorting of bad and good quality matches that goes together with movements
in productivity. We therefore include worker by ﬁrm match ﬁxed eﬀects in our
most stringent speciﬁcation. These eliminate observed and unobserved components
of worker-, ﬁrm-, or match- speciﬁc heterogeneity and thus fully account for the
sorting and matching of workers and ﬁrms.
When estimating the impact of productivity on wages it is important to note that
movements in labor productivity will capture both movements along the production
function and shifts in the production function. Changes in product demand and
factor prices may alter the scale of production and the capital-labor ratio and thereby
aﬀect labor productivity. Hence, OLS estimation of equation 3 may suﬀer from both
omitted variables, since demand shocks in combination with decreasing returns may
simultaneously alter productivity and wages if the labor supply curve is upward
sloping, and endogeneity, since wage shocks may aﬀect productivity through changes
in the scale of production and/or factor proportions. Technological progress, if
appropriately mapped by physical TFP, shifts the production function providing an
11exogenous source of ﬂuctuations in labor productivity. Hence, our strategy is to
use a well-deﬁned measure of ﬁrm-level TFP as an instrument for ﬁrm-level labor
productivity. Next, we turn to the derivation of the TFP series.
2.2 Measuring TFP
We use a production-function approach to derive our technology series. The un-
derlying idea is that technology can be measured as the residual from a production
function once changes in both stocks and variable utilization of the production fac-
tors are accounted for. We start by postulating the following production function
for ﬁrm :
 = (    ) (4)
where gross output  is produced combining the stock of capital , labor 
energy  and intermediate materials .T h e ﬁrm may also adjust the level of
utilization of capital,  and labor, .F i n a l l y , is the index of technology
that we want to capture.
2.2.1 Measuring TFP: Derivation
Using small letters to denote logs, taking the total diﬀerential of the log of (4) and
invoking cost minimization, we arrive at:
∆ = [∆ + ∆]+∆ (5)
where ∆ is the growth rate of gross output and  the overall returns to scale.
Denote  as the cost share of factor  in total costs. Then, ∆ is a cost-share
weighted input index deﬁned as ∆+∆+∆+∆. Simi-
larly, the change in utilization of capital and labor is denoted by ∆ = ∆+
12∆.6 Thus, given data on factor compensation, changes in output, input and
utilization, and an estimate of the returns to scale , the resulting residual ∆
provides a times series of technology growth for the ﬁrm. Note that ∆ reduces
to a gross-output Solow residual if  =1 , ∆ =0 , ∀  and there are no economic
proﬁts.7 Hence, ∆ is a Solow residual purged of the eﬀects of non-constant
returns, imperfect competition, and varying factor utilization.
In order to properly identify the contribution of technology, it is also important
to distinguish between employees with diﬀerent levels of education. Hence, using








where superscript   and  denotes workers with less than high school
education, high school education and tertiary education, respectively, and 

denotes the cost share of category  workers in total labor costs, where  ∈
{}. Hence, our labor input index will capture changes in the skill
composition of the workforce of the ﬁrm.8
The main empirical problem associated with (5) is that capital and labor uti-
lization are unobserved. A solution to this problem is to include proxies for factor
utilization. Here, we follow the approach taken by Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Re-
belo (1995), who use energy consumption as a proxy for the ﬂow of capital services.
This procedure, which is well suited for our manufacturing sector data, can be legit-
6Here, the cost shares are assumed to be constants. We will return to this assumption later.
7The zero-proﬁt condition implies that the factor cost shares in total costs equal the factor cost
shares in total revenues, which are used when computing the Solow residual.
8We are, however, not accounting for the contribution to production of the unobservable skills
of workers. Note that this is not a problem for the estimation of eq. (3) as long as the speciﬁcation
includes worker ﬁxed eﬀects.
13imized by assuming that there is a zero elasticity of substitution between energy and
the ﬂow of capital services. This, in turn, implies energy and capital services to be
perfectly correlated.9 Assuming that labor utilization is constant,10 and including
a set of time dummies to capture any aggregate trends in technology growth ()
we arrive at the empirical speciﬁcation used to estimate technology shocks
∆ = ∆e  +  + ∆ (7)
where input growth, ∆e ,i sd e ﬁned as ( + )∆ + ∆ + ∆.
Note that ∆ encompasses any ﬁrm-speciﬁc constant/drift term.
2.2.2 Measuring TFP: The importance of getting the measures right
Our key identifying assumption in the IV estimation of equation (3) is that TFP is
exogenous to individual wages, and only aﬀects wages through labor productivity.
Here we illustrate some of the details of the empirical implementation of TFP, and
we discuss why some of these details are crucial for this condition to be met. Funda-
mentally, we show how using alternative measures of TFP based on sector deﬂated
output or value-added rather than gross output would yield an invalid instrument.11
A ﬁrst point is that it is crucial that nominal output is deﬂated by appropriate
ﬁrm-level prices and not by sectoral price indices as is customary. We use ﬁrm-level
prices aggregated from unit prices for each good the ﬁrm produces (see Section 3
9In Section 4.6 we examine the impact of using an alternative TFP series derived from estimates
of the capital stock, where we can relax the Leontief assumption.
10In a related paper, Carlsson (2003) experiments with using various proxies for labor utilization
(hours per employee, overtime per employee and the frequency of industrial accidents per hour
worked) when estimating production functions like equation (7) on Swedish two-digit manufacturing
industry data. Including these controls has no discernible impact on the results.
11Similar problems would, of course, emerge if we studied the direct eﬀects of TFP on wages.
14for further details), allowing us to derive true volume measures from gross output
at the ﬁrm-level. Following Klette and Griliches (1996), the problem with the usual
approach, which uses a sectoral price index () instead of a ﬁrm-level price
index () can easily be seen by noting that the measure of real output deﬂated
by sectoral prices would be ln()=l n  +l n ( ) Hence, real
output deﬂated by sectoral prices would be a function of relative prices. Assume
next that the ﬁrm faces a constant elastic demand function, and sets its price as a
(constant) markup over marginal cost as in the standard monopolistic-competition
model. Since marginal cost, under standard assumptions, is proportional to unit
labor cost, the relative price will be a function of wages (see Carlsson and Nord-
ström Skans (Forthcoming), for direct empirical evidence). Importantly, this implies
that sales deﬂated by sectoral prices ln() a n dc o n s e q u e n t l ya l s ot h el a -
bor productivity and TFP measures derived from it, will respond to idiosyncratic
wage shocks. The relationship between sector-deﬂated labor productivity (or TFP)
and wages would then produce upwardly biased estimates of the causal impact of
productivity on wages, even if ﬁrms are wage takers and produce according to a
constant returns to scale technology (in which case marginal cost is independent of
the scale of the production).
A second point is that gross output, as opposed to value-added, should be used
as the output measure. TFP series derived from standard measures of value-added
are only valid under perfect competition and constant returns. Instead, as shown
in Appendix C, in the case of decreasing returns to scale a TFP measure derived
from value-added would be negatively correlated with the growth rate of primary
inputs. The drawback from this negative correlation can be easily illustrated in an
example. Suppose there is a positive demand shock and the ﬁrm has decreasing
15returns. Proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms are likely to respond by increasing production,
pushing up the demand for labor, electricity and other intermediate goods. As a
consequence of decreasing returns, measured TFP based on VA will decline. If the
demand shock has a positive impact on wages, for instance due to an upward sloping
labor demand curve, we then expect a negative bias in the wage regressions.
Finally, we use electricity consumption to proxy for variations in the use of capital
services as suggested by Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1995). Although this
may not be optimal in all settings, it should provide a good approximation for the
manufacturing ﬁrms we study. The alternative would be to estimate capital stocks
using the perpetual inventory method. A disadvantage of this alternative, in ﬁnite
samples, is that it would require book values as starting values and these may be
poor proxies for physical capital since they tend to be strategically constructed for
tax purposes. Using electricity ﬂows also has the advantage that it accounts for the
actual use of the capital stock, i.e. the ﬂow of productive services from capital, since
electricity consumption responds to both capital utilization and changes in the stock
of capital.
The empirical importance of these measurement issues are all thoroughly exam-
ined in Section 4.8.
2.2.3 Measuring TFP: Empirical implementation
When empirically implementing speciﬁcation (7), we take an approach akin to the
strategy outlined by Basu, Fernald, and Shapiro (2001). First, the speciﬁcation is
regarded as a log-linear approximation around the steady state. Thus, the prod-
ucts  (i.e. the output elasticities) are treated as constants.12 Note that using
12G i v e nt h a tw ec a n n o to b s e r v et h eﬁrms’ capital stock to any precision, we cannot construct a
credible direct measure of the ﬁrms’ total capital cost, either. This, in turn, precludes the use of
16constant cost shares (including the cost share of labor) precludes variation in wages
to spill into variation in the TFP measure if, for any reason,  is an imper-
fect measure of the output elasticity of labor input. Second, the steady-state cost
shares are estimated as the time average of the cost shares for the two-digit industry
to which the ﬁrm belongs (SNI92/NACE). Third, to calculate the cost shares, we
assume that ﬁrms make zero proﬁt in the steady state.13 Taking total costs as ap-
proximately equal to total revenues, we can infer the cost shares from factor shares
in total revenues. The cost share of capital and energy is then given by one minus
the sum of the cost shares for all other factors.
Note that the estimation of equation (7) cannot be carried out by OLS, since
the ﬁrm is likely to consider the current state of technology when making its in-
put choices.14 We exploit the panel nature of our ﬁrm-level data to use internal
instruments, as described in Section 4.
Once the series of technical change has been obtained following equation (7), the
next step consists of integrating the growth rates in technology into a (log level)
a Törnqvist-type (second-order) approximation relying on time-varying cost shares. However, the
negligible eﬀects reported in Carlsson (2003) from using time averages relative to time-varying cost
shares indicate that this is not crucial.
13Using the data underlying Carlsson (2003) we ﬁn dt h a tt h et i m ea v e r a g e( 1968 − 1993)f o r
the share of economic proﬁts in aggregate Swedish manufacturing revenues is about −0001.T h u s ,
supporting the assumption made here.
14This is the so-called transmission problem in the empirical production function literature. Tech-
nology change (i.e. the residual) represents a change in a state variable for the ﬁrm and changes in
the level of production inputs (the explanatory variables) are changes in the ﬁrm’s control variables,
which should react to changes in the state variable. In this case there will be a correlation between
the error term and the explanatory variable, hence the need of IV methods.
17technology series using the following recursion




Note that the initial level of technology (0) is a ﬁrm/sector-speciﬁc constant
that is not observed, but will be captured by ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects in the second stage
estimation.
2.3 Sector vs. idiosyncratic productivity










labor productivity. These measures can easily be obtained
by running a regression of ﬁrm-level labor productivity, measured as gross output
per worker, on sector-speciﬁc time dummies. The projection from the sector-speciﬁc
time dummies in this regression is then a measure of 
, and the residuals are
am e a s u r eo f
. We use employee weights when running this decomposition,
such that sector-speciﬁc productivity is the average employee-weighted productivity,
and idiosyncratic productivity is the ﬁrm-level deviation from this average. In an
analogous fashion, we decompose the TFP series derived from (8) into a sectoral
and an idiosyncratic TFP component.
3D a t a
We combine three data sources to construct our sample. The employer side of the
data set is primarily drawn from the Statistics Sweden Industry Statistics Survey
(IS) and contains annual information for the years 1990-1996 on inputs and out-
put as well as geographical location for all Swedish industrial (manufacturing and
18mining) plants with 10 employees or more and a sample of smaller plants (see Ap-
pendix B for details).15 Here we focus on continuing single-plant ﬁrms. Excluding
multi-plant ﬁrms avoids the problem of identifying in which establishment of the
ﬁrm technological change originates. The focus on continuing plants helps us deal
with possible selection eﬀects due to ﬁrm demographics associated with productivity
shocks.
A crucial feature of IS is that it includes a ﬁrm-speciﬁc producer price index
constructed by Statistics Sweden. The ﬁrm-speciﬁc price index is a chained index
with Paasche links that combines plant-speciﬁc unit values and detailed disaggre-
gate producer-price indices (either at the goods level, when available, or at the most
disaggregate sectoral level available). Note that in the case in which a plant-speciﬁc
unit-value price is missing (e.g., when the ﬁrm introduces a new good), Statistics
Sweden uses a price index for similar goods deﬁned at the minimal level of aggrega-
tion (starting at 4-digits goods code level). The disaggregate sectoral producer-price
indices are only used when a plausible goods-price index is not available. Thus, the
concern raised by Klette and Griliches (1996) regarding biased returns to scale esti-
mates when sectoral price deﬂators are used in the computations of real gross output
should not be an issue here.
The employee side of the data is obtained from the Register Based Labor Market
Statistics data base (RAMS) maintained by Statistics Sweden. This data contains
information on annual labor earnings for all privately employed workers in Sweden.
The raw data was compiled by the Swedish Tax Authority in order to calculate
taxes. The data includes information on annual earnings, as well as the ﬁrst and
last remunerated month received by each employee from each ﬁrm. We use this
15The availability of detailed factor input data, speciﬁcally electricity consumption, which are
crucial for the present study, limits the sample years to 1990-1996.
19information to construct a measure of monthly wages for each employee in each of
the ﬁrms in our sample. The data lacks information on actual hours, so in order to
restrict attention to workers reasonably close to full time workers we only consider
a person to be a full-time employee if the (monthly) wage exceeds 75 percent of the
mean wage of janitors employed by municipalities.16 We only include employment
spells that cover November following the practice of Statistics Sweden. We focus on
primary jobs and therefore only keep the job resulting in the highest wage for workers
with multiple jobs. The data also includes information on age, gender, education,
and immigration status of the individual workers.
Unemployment and vacancy data at the local labor market level for November
is collected from the National Labor Market Board (AMS). Here, we rely on the
1993 deﬁnition of homogenous local labor markets constructed by Statistics Sweden
using commuting patterns, which divide Sweden into 109 geographic areas.
Note that we use the labor input measure available in IS to compute labor
productivity, whereas the labor input measures used when estimating TFP are taken
from RAMS. As mentioned above, the IS employment data is based on a survey
collected by Statistics Sweden, whereas the RAMS employment data is based on
the income statements that employers are, by law, required to send to the Swedish
Tax Authority. Since the IS and RAMS measures of labor input are independently
collected it is very unlikely that any measurement errors are common in the two.
This, in turn, is important for ruling out that any observed relationship between
labor productivity and technology is only due to common measurement errors in
16Using a similar procedure with RAMS data, Nordström Skans, Edin, and Holmlund (2009)
found that this gives rise to a computed wage distribution that is close to the direct measure of the
wage distribution taken from the 3 percent random sample in the LINDA database, where hourly
wages are the measure of pay.
20the labor input measures.
Both RAMS and IS provide unique individual and ﬁrm identiﬁers that allow us
to link the employees to each of the ﬁr m si nt h es a m p l e . S i n c et h eR A M Sd a t a
covers the universe of workers, we observe every worker employed in each of the
IS ﬁrms during the sample period. Given the restrictions mentioned above and
after standard cleaning procedures (see Appendix B for details), we are left with
a balanced panel of 1136 ﬁrms observed over the years 1990-1996 and 472555
employee/year observations distributed over 106050 individuals. Our used data set
cover about 10 percent of the total manufacturing sector.
4 Estimation results
4.1 Estimating TFP
We ﬁrst estimate the technology disturbances relying on the empirical speciﬁcation
(7) outlined in section 2 above. Here, we allow the returns to scale parameter  to
vary across durables and non-durables sectors as suggested by Basu, Fernald, and
Shapiro (2001). The models include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, which capture any systematic
diﬀerences across ﬁrms in average technology growth. Since the ﬁrm is likely to
consider the current state of technology when making its input choices, we need to
resort to an IV technique. Following Carlsson and Smedsaas (2007) and Marchetti
and Nucci (2005), we use a diﬀerence GMM estimator developed by Arellano and
Bond (1991) and report robust, ﬁnite-sample corrected, standard errors following
Windmeijer (2005). Here we use ∆e −,f o r ≥ 3 as instruments and collapse the
instrument set in order to avoid overﬁtting (see Roodman, 2006).17
17Given that we use a diﬀerence GMM estimator, the second and higher ordered lags of ∆ 
should be valid instruments under the null hypothesis of no serial dependence in the residual.









Note: Sample 1991-1996 with 1,136
ﬁrms. Diﬀerence GMM second-step es-
timates with robust Windmeijer (2005)
ﬁnite-sample corrected standard errors in
parenthesis. See main text for instru-
ments used. Regression includes time
dummies and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. P-values
for diagnostic tests inside brackets.
In Table 1, we present the estimation results for equation (7). The estimate
of the returns to scale for the durables sector equals 099 and 088 for the non-
durables sector, but both are somewhat imprecisely estimated (s.e. of 019 and 022,
respectively).18 It is reassuring to see that the point estimates of the returns to scale
are very similar to estimates reported by earlier studies. For example, Basu, Fernald,
and Shapiro (2001) reports estimates of 103 and 078 for durables and non-durables,
respectively, using U.S. sectoral data. Moreover, the Hansen test of over-identifying
restrictions cannot reject the joint null hypothesis of a valid instrument set and a
However, when including the second lag in the instrument set, the Hansen test of the over-identifying
restrictions is signiﬁcant at the ﬁve-percent level.
18The data does not allow us to identify the returns to scale parameter separately across two-digit
industries since many sub-samples become too small.
22correctly speciﬁed model.
Importantly, Table 1 show that the AR(2) test of the diﬀerenced residuals indi-
cates that there is no serial correlation in the estimated technology change series.
This implies that we can regard these changes as permanent innovations to the
technology level. The fact that our shocks in general appear to be of a permanent
nature is consistent with the view that changes in TFP are capturing shifts in the
production function. This should however be kept in mind when comparing our
results with previous literature (e.g. Guiso, Schivardi, and Pistaferri (2005)), where
the role on wage determination of temporary vs. permanent shocks to sales has been
evaluated.
4.2 The impact of productivity on wages
Before moving into the main results of the paper, we provide a brief description of the
distribution of wages, TFP and labor productivity. Summary statistics are available
in Table 2. First of all note that the dispersion of productivity is much wider than
the dispersion of wages, but that this relationship is to a large extent driven by large
diﬀerences between ﬁr m s .T h ev a r i a n c e( o v e rt i m e )w i t h i na ne m p l o y m e n ts p e l l( i . e .
am a t c hb e t w e e naw o r k e ra n daﬁrm) is about equal. In the analysis we distinguish
between a sectoral and an idiosyncratic component as discussed above. The sectors
are identiﬁed following the 16 employer federations that sign collective agreements in
the manufacturing sector.1920 When decomposing productivity within and between
sectors we see that the within-match standard deviation of idiosyncratic ﬁrm-level
productivity is nearly three times larger than the variance of sectoral productivity.
19In practice we allocate the ﬁrm to the most common employer federation among ﬁrms in the
same ﬁve-digit industry according to the standard NACE classiﬁcation.
20The Appendix provides further details on the Swedish institutions and the bargaining system.
23Table 2: Summary Statistics
All Men
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Wages:
 9.615 0.313 9.662 0.308
 (Within Match) - 0.146 - 0.146
Productivity:
 6.835 0.667 6.865 0.677
 (Within Match) - 0.155 - 0.157

 -0 . 0 4 9-0 . 0 5 0

 (Within Match) - 0.036 - 0.037

 -0 . 6 6 9-0 . 6 8 0

 (Within Match) - 0.130 - 0.131
TFP
Φ
(Within Match) - 0.022 - 0.022
Φ
(Within Match) - 0.092 - 0.092
Worker characteristics:
 39.8 11.8 39.7 11.9
Share of Men 0.794 1
Share of HE 0.511 0.519
Share of TE 0.122 0.127
Share of Non-Immigrants 0.895 0.904
Firm-Size 212.6 213.8
Observations 472,555 374,975
Note: The "Within match" rows shows the dispersion within a combi-
nation of person and ﬁrm. All statistics are weighted according to the
number of employees.
24We proceed by investigating the role of sectoral and ﬁrm idiosyncratic productiv-
ity on individual wages, following equation 3. The ﬁrst column in Table 3 shows the
results of estimating a simple OLS regression that relates labor productivity to in-
dividual wages controlling for ﬁrm-level ﬁxed eﬀects, but excluding worker controls.
Column 2 shows the same speciﬁcation, now using idiosyncratic and sector-level
TFP as instruments for the two labor productivity measures. Column 3 adds a
third-order age polynomial and worker ﬁxed eﬀects. Column 4 presents our most
stringent speciﬁcation, including match-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Column 5 repeats the
last exercise for males. Standard errors are robust to intra-ﬁrm correlation.
Both ﬁrm-level idiosyncratic labor productivity and sectoral labor productivity
matter for wage determination. However, in order to obtain this conclusion it is
fundamental to instrument the labor productivity measures, at least with regards to
the sector-speciﬁc productivity. The OLS results in column 1 suggest a positive and
statistically signiﬁcant impact of idiosyncratic labor productivity on wages, with
an elasticity of 0033 The estimated coeﬃcient of the sector-speciﬁc productivity
presents a similar magnitude (0027), but is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. In
sharp contrast, when we use TFP to instrument the labor productivity measures in
column 2, we ﬁnd an elasticity of wages to sectoral productivity that is substantially
larger than the elasticity with respect to idiosyncratic productivity, 0123 compared
to 0032.B o t he s t i m a t e dc o e ﬃcients in column 2 are statistically signiﬁcant at the
1% level.21 We will return to a discussion below of potential explanations for why
the sectoral OLS results may be downwardly biased. Table 4 shows the ﬁrst-stage
regressions. The values of the F statistics are well above 10, suggesting that our
instruments are not weak. More importantly, the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic
21In a similar vein, Fuss and Wintr (2009) ﬁnds that aggregate wages per employee at the ﬁrm-
level are more reactive to sectoral than ﬁrm level TFP shocks in Belgium.
25Table 3: The Impact of Productivity on Individual Wages. OLS and IV Results
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )
Estimation Method: OLS IV IV IV IV
Sample: All All All All Males

 0.027 0.123** 0.149** 0.149** 0.149**
(0.022) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.041)

 0.033** 0.032** 0.050** 0.051** 0.054**
(0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes — —
Worker FE No No Yes — —
Worker Characteristics No No Yes Yes Yes
Match SpeciﬁcF i x e dE ﬀects No No No Yes Yes
Observations 472,555 472,555 472,555 472,555 374,975
Firms 1,136 1,136 1,136 1,136 1,136
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic - 46.83 NA 44.52 39.94
P-value - 0 NA 0 0
Worker*Firm Matches - - - 107,086 82,702
Note: * (**) denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 (1) percent level. Standard errors clustered on ﬁrms
reported inside parentheses. All speciﬁcations include time eﬀects and labor market tightness.
Individual controls include age, age squared and age cubed (columns 3-5). K-P denotes the
Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk LM statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the equation is un-
deridentiﬁed. P-value denotes the associated p-value for the test.
(see Kleibergen and Paap (2006)), presented at the bottom of Table 3, clearly reject
the null hypothesis of underidentiﬁcation.22
The rest of Table 3 shows that the results are somewhat larger when we include
covariates that capture the skills and qualities of workers and indicators of match
quality. Column 3 accounts for individual observed and unobserved heterogeneity by
22Note that the fact that the ﬁrst stages are close to unity suggests that the endogenous response
in input usage is small. This is reassuring since we are using a balanced panel and, due to the
relatively short period available, are unable to model exits of ﬁrms.
26Table 4: First-Stage Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)







 0.854** 0.000 0.842** -0.020
(0.087) (0.148) (0.088) (0.141)

 -0.000 0.846** 0.000 0.838**
(0.008) (0.031) (0.009) (0.031)
Firm FE Yes Yes — —
Worker FE No No — —
Worker Characteristics No No Yes Yes
Worker by Firm FE No No Yes Yes
Observations 472,555 472,555 472,555 472,555
Firms 1,136 1,136 1,136 1,136
F-Stat(Φ
 = Φ
 =0 ) 49.00** 382.8** 46.82** 378.8**
Worker by Firm Matches - - 107,086 107,086
Note: * (**) denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 (1) percent level. Standard errors clustered
on ﬁrms reported inside parentheses. Regressions also include time eﬀects and labor
market tightness. Individual controls (columns 3-4) include age, age squared and age
cubed. F denotes the F statistic for the excluded instruments.
means of an age polynomial and individual ﬁxed eﬀects. The idiosyncratic compo-
nent increases to 0050, while the sectoral component increases to 0149.T h er e s u l t s
are virtually identical if worker and ﬁrm eﬀects are replaced by worker-ﬁrm match
ﬁxed eﬀects, as shown in column 4. The latter may be a result of the fact that we
are using a fairly short panel and only a subset of the economy, which means that
the individual ﬁxed eﬀects in many cases are identiﬁed from single spells (i.e. that
the match ﬁxed eﬀects are already captured in the model with worker and ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀects).23
23In regressions not reported in the text, we have also analyzed the direct eﬀect of TFP on wages.
27Our data does not allow us to properly control for part-time work, but since
part-time work in Sweden is very rare among males in the manufacturing sector we
have reestimated the model using only males. Column 5 presents results for the
male sub-sample. The estimates show that the response of male wages to changes in
productivity is very similar to that obtained in the overall sample. The elasticity of
wages to sectoral productivity is almost three times as large as the elasticity to idio-
syncratic movements in productivity, both estimates being statistically signiﬁcant
at standard levels of testing.
Albeit the estimated elasticities are far from unity, one must bear in mind that
the variance of the underlying productivity processes is relatively large. This is es-
pecially true in the case of idiosyncratic ﬁrm-level productivity. Removing variation
between ﬁrms and using our preferred estimates in column 4 of table 3, we ﬁnd that
an increase of one standard deviation in either of the productivity measures (sector
or idiosyncratic) raises wages by about one quarter of the average real wage growth
in our sample.24
For this purpose, we parallel the speciﬁcation in column 4 of Table 3 and estimate the impact of
TFP on wages using OLS. We ﬁnd marginally smaller eﬀects on wages than those reported in Table
3( 0124 and 0042 respectively). This is not surprising, considering that the the ﬁrst stage of the
IV regressions (Table 4) showed estimates of the TFP components somewhat smaller than unity.
This model is, however, more sensitive to potentially attenuating measurement errors.
24Average real wage growth within the manufacturing establishments included in the sample is
2.4%. Considering that our estimates are conditional on time eﬀects, the estimated elasticities
should be read as the impact of the diﬀerent productivity components on real wages. Hence, the es-
timated impact of one s.d. idiosyncratic productivity on wages amounts to 28% (0.051*0.130/0.024)
of the average real wage growth, while the impact of one s.d. sectoral productivity is 22%
(0.149*0.036/0.024)
284.3 Returns to scale, OLS and IV
The estimated impact of sectoral productivity developments on wages in the IV
speciﬁcations is much larger than in the OLS regressions. A simple yet plausible
explanation for such diﬀerences is attenuation bias due to measurement errors, but
in that case it would be expected that there is a similar gap between IV and OLS
estimates for the idiosyncratic productivity shocks. As this bias was not found,
our results are most likely indicative of an endogenous negative association between
labor productivity and wages at the sectoral level, which we try to examine next.
One straightforward explanation is a combination of decreasing returns to scale
and an upward sloping labor supply curve, the intuition being that when ﬁrms choose
to scale up production (e.g., in response to demand shocks) they will endogenously
lower labor productivity if returns to scale are decreasing. The resulting increase in
demand for labor will lead to higher wages if the supply curve facing the sector (or
ﬁrm) is upward sloping. This may explain why instrumentation matters speciﬁcally
at the sectoral level and not at the idiosyncratic ﬁrm level, since wages may be
pushed up more in response to sectoral adjustments if ﬁrms within a sector compete
over a restricted set of workers. Hence, increased demand for labor within a sector
may raise wages while single ﬁrms may be allowed to hire freely without aﬀecting
wages in the market. Naturally, diﬀerential wage responses to increases in ﬁrm labor
demand versus sectoral labor demand may be reinforced by sectoral bargaining.
While the combination of decreasing returns with an upward sloping wage set-
ting curve is consistent with our main results, we also try to provide a piece of
somewhat more direct evidence by tentatively investigating the role of returns to
scale. As shown previously, estimated returns to scale vary between the manufac-
turing plants producing durable goods (decreasing returns) and those producing
29non-durables (almost constant returns). Although our estimates of the returns to
scale are imprecise, similar diﬀerences between durables and non-durables have been
previously found in the literature (e.g. Basu, Fernald, and Shapiro (2001)). Hence,
we expect the gap between IV and OLS estimates for sectoral productivity to be
larger in ﬁrms operating in durable goods sectors than in ﬁrms operating in the
non-durables sectors.
In Table 5 we estimate our preferred model (i.e. with match-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects)
using OLS and IV separately, for ﬁrms with decreasing and constant returns. The
results are consistent with the proposed hypothesis. The entire diﬀerence between
the sectoral OLS and IV estimates stems from the ﬁrms facing decreasing returns
in our sample, while diﬀerences within ﬁrms facing constant returns are negligible
and non-statistically signiﬁcant. In the case of ﬁrms with decreasing returns, we see
that the elasticity of wages to sectoral shocks becomes highly signiﬁcant and more
than 4 times larger in the IV speciﬁcation (014 vs. 0027 in OLS). Interestingly, we
also see that instrumentation leads to a non-negligible increase in the estimate of the
idiosyncratic productivity eﬀects on wages (from an elasticity of 0033 in the OLS
speciﬁcation in column 1 to 0052 in column 2).25 This suggests that aggregation
over the sectors also blurred an important role for scale adjustment in response to
idiosyncratic productivity, in the sectors where returns are decreasing.
4.4 Bargaining power, outside options and sectoral productivity
The diﬀerence in the estimated impact on wages between sectoral and idiosyncratic
productivity implies that workers extract more rents when productivity advance-
25The diﬀerences between the IV and OLS elasticities in columns (1) and (2) are statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The p-values of one-sided tests are 0.044 in the case of idiosyncratic
productivity and 0.004 in the case of sectoral productivity.
30Table 5: OLS and IV with Decreasing and Constant Returns to Scale
(1) (2) (2) (4)
Estimation Method: OLS IV OLS IV
Returns to scale: Decreasing returns Constant returns
(Non-Durables) (Durables)

 0.027 0.140** 0.177** 0.169**
(0.028) (0.042) (0.038) (0.055)

 0.033** 0.052** 0.050** 0.049**
(0.007) (0.012) (0.011) (0.017)
Worker Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker by Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 286,907 286,907 185,648 185,648
Worker*Firm Matches 64,084 64,084 43,002 43,002
Firms 720 720 416 416
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic NA 42.89 NA 63.50
P-value NA 0 NA 0
Note: * (**) denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 (1) percent level. Standard errors clustered on
ﬁrms reported inside parentheses. All speciﬁcations include time eﬀects and labor market
tightness. Worker characteristics include age, age squared and age cubed. K-P denotes the
Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk LM statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the equation is
underidentiﬁed. P-value denotes the associated p-value for the test.
31ments are shared within a bargaining sector.26 This can be explained by two dif-
ferent mechanisms. Firstly, workers’ bargaining power may diﬀer depending on the
level of negotiation. In practice, workers may have more bargaining power during
sectoral negotiations, since strikes are illegal during local bargaining but not during
sectoral bargaining (see Appendix A for a discussion). Secondly, the shocks that are
shared within a sector also aﬀect the outside option of workers (or equivalently, the
quality of counterbids in a poaching game, as in Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin
(2006)), strengthening their bargaining position. This may occur if workers are mo-
bile within sectors clustered in certain geographic areas. In this case, an increase in
the bargaining position of workers is expected to be higher if technology improves
i na l lo ft h eﬁrms operating in the same sector.
In order to disentangle the two forces outlined above, we re-estimated the model
controlling for predicted outside wages.27 If the higher elasticity of wages to sectoral
shocks is due to an improvement in the outside option of workers, we expect the
estimated elasticities to decline once an estimate of the outside option of workers is
included in the regression.
We estimate the outside wages as the predictions from 763 local labor market
(109 areas) and year-speciﬁc( 7 years) wage regressions using information about
age, gender, immigration status (7 regions) and education (both four-digit ﬁeld and
three-digit level codes building on ISCED 97). We do these ﬁrst-stage regressions for
the universe of full-time primary employments in the private sector, which amounts
26Interestingly, this result does not seem to be related to the particular deﬁnition of the sector we
use. We have experimented using standard deﬁnitions of sectors, following the NACE classiﬁcation
at a two-digit level instead of the employer confederation of the ﬁrms, and ﬁnd very similar results.
27These estimates, however, might be endogenous, so the interpretation of these results should
be read with a grain of salt.
32in our sample to 11523194 observations for 2653639 workers. As expected, re-
estimating equation (3) controlling for these predicted wages (highly signiﬁcant with
an elasticity of 058) in the regressions reduces the impact of sectoral productivity
(from 0149 to 0096), but a substantial diﬀerence between the idiosyncratic and
sectoral estimates remains (0057). Moreover, the elasticity of wages to idiosyncratic
productivity is much less aﬀected by the inclusion of outside wages. The diﬀerence
between the two elasticities is marginally statistically signiﬁcant (p-value of 011).
Taken at face value, these estimates suggest that the workers’ ability to extract
larger rents from sectoral than idiosyncratic shocks is equally driven by the two
mechanisms we postulated: stronger bargaining power and better outside options.
4.5 The role of dynamics
The speciﬁcations we have presented so far are static, i.e., they assume that the wage
impact of technology-driven innovations in productivity is immediate. In reality,
permanent technology shocks might require some time to be absorbed by wages,
e.g., if wage bargaining takes place biannually. In order to assess the importance
of potential delays in the impact of productivity, we have estimated models with
lagged productivity.
Estimates from speciﬁcations with lagged productivity are presented in Table 6.
We concentrate on our preferred speciﬁcation (including match-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects)
and proceed parsimoniously, ﬁrst introducing one lag in column 2 and two lags in
column 3.28 The bottom of the table shows the long-run accumulated eﬀect, and
its associated level of signiﬁcance. The results show that there is a role for lagged
productivity in shaping current wages. The eﬀect does, however, seem to deteriorate
28Given the short nature of our panel we were not able to estimate models with more than two
lags to any precision.
33Table 6: Dynamic Eﬀects
(1) (2) (3)
Estimation method: IV IV IV


















Total Sector Eﬀect 0.149** 0.157** 0.303**
s.e. (0.038) (0.045) (0.110)
Total Idiosyncratic Eﬀect 0.051** 0.068** 0.091**
s.e. (0.010) (0.015) (0.020)
Worker Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Worker by Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 472,555 402,058 335,291
Firms 1,136 1,136 1,136
Worker*Firm Matches 107,086 99,473 93,316
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 44.52 25.79 4.775
P-value 0 0 0.029
Note: * (**) denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 (1) percent level. Standard errors clustered
on ﬁrms reported inside parentheses. All speciﬁcations include time eﬀects and labor
market tightness. Worker characteristics include age, age squared and age cubed. K-
P denotes the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk LM statistic for testing the null hypothesis
that the equation is underidentiﬁed. P-value denotes the associated p-value for the
test.
34fairly rapidly and in the case of sectoral productivity we never ﬁnd the individual lags
to be statistically signiﬁcant. Although the individual lags are estimated with poor
precision, the long-run elasticity remains statistically signiﬁcant in all cases. The
magnitude of the long-run impact is about twice as large as the contemporaneous
impact for both the idiosyncratic eﬀect (0091 vs. 0051) and the sectoral eﬀect
(0303 vs. 0149) when two lags are considered.
4.6 Variations
A very active literature (Shimer (2005), Hall (2003), Pissarides (2007)) discusses
why unemployment ﬂuctuates so dramatically over the business cycle compared to
the smooth movements in aggregate productivity. A key element in this debate is
the exact modeling of how ﬁrms react in their setting of wages for incumbents and
new hires when productivity changes (Haefke, Sonntag, and Van Rens (2008)). We
have analyzed the impact on incumbents and new hires of sectoral and idiosyncratic
productivity, but found no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in their impact. However, it should
be acknowledged that the interacted estimates are quite imprecise. We have also
investigated if productivity advances aﬀect workers with diﬀerent skills diﬀerently,
again ﬁnding no signiﬁcant heterogeneity, although with poor precision. Finally, we
have analyzed whether productivity has a diﬀerential impact depending on whether
the shocks are positive or negative, where one might suspect that negative shocks
have a smaller eﬀect due to downward nominal wage rigidity. We ﬁnd no evidence
of such asymmetries. Although this may seem surprising, it should be noted that
the magnitudes of the estimated elasticities are such that the wage impact of any
“normal” shock is smaller than the average nominal wage increase among incumbent
workers. This implies that there is indeed scope for a symmetric impact of positive
35and negative productivity shocks, even if nominal wages never fall.
4.7 Productivity and the selection of workers
Our main estimates are only marginally aﬀected by the inclusion of individual spe-
ciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. This suggests that compositional eﬀects through ﬁrm recruitment
and ﬁring policies as a response to technology-induced changes in ﬁrm-level produc-
tivity should be minor. In order to make this point more precise, we relate the level
of productivity to measures of the employed workers’ earnings capacity.29
To this end, we ﬁr s te s t i m a t eat w o - w a yﬁxed eﬀects model with wages as the
dependent variable, including person and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects along the lines of the
Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) model (also including an age polynomial and
year dummies), relying on data for the universe of full-time primary employments
in the Swedish private sector during the period 1985-1989, i.e. the available years
before our sample.30 All in all, this amounts to 8776223 linked employer-employee
observations. From the pre-sample estimations we extract the person eﬀects, which
we use as dependent variables in the same speciﬁcations that we used for our wage
regressions.31
This analysis has two virtues. First, we use pre-dated data to estimate the
person eﬀects. Thus, the person eﬀects are clearly exogenous to our innovations in
technology. Second, our skill measure has the same scale as the wage, and the size
of the selection responses can thus be compared to the endogenous wage responses.
29See e.g. Abowd, Kramarz, Perez-Duarte, and Schmutte (2010) for an interpretation of esti-
m a t e dp e r s o ne ﬀects in a structural matching framework.
30We use the Abowd, Creecy and Kramarz (2002) algorithm as implemented for STATA in a2reg
by Amin Ouazad.
31Although the time span for estimating the person eﬀects is short we ﬁnd a very high correlation
(096) with estimates of person eﬀects for the full 1985-1996 period, which is reassuring.
36Table 7: The Eﬀects of Productivity on the Selection of Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method: IV IV IV IV
Sample: All Less than High Tertiary
High School School Education

 -0.024 -0.044* -0.001 -0.026
(0.015) (0.020) (0.018) (0.059)

 -0.003 -0.001 -0.007 -0.008
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 417,870 161,954 207,236 48,675
Number of Firms 1,136 1,135 1,135 1,128
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 43.83 47.58 38.93 44.33
P-value 0 0 0 0
Note: The dependent variable is the person eﬀect of the individual as extracted from a wage
regression on person and establishment ﬁxed eﬀects, an age polynomial, and year dummies for
the entire private sector during 1985-1989. * (**) denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 (1) percent level.
Standard errors clustered on ﬁrms reported inside parentheses. All speciﬁcations include time
eﬀects and labor market tightness. Worker characteristics include age, age squared and age
cubed, a gender dummy, a high school dummy, a university dummy, immigration dummies by
seven regions of origin. K-P denotes the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk LM statistic for testing the
null hypothesis that the equation is underidentiﬁed. P-value denotes the associated p-value
for the test.
Note also that any noise in the estimated person eﬀects will be in the residual of the
second-stage regressions, and thus only aﬀect precision and not the point estimates.
The results from the IV model including ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects are presented in Table
7. Column 1 shows the overall results, and columns 2 to 4 show separate estimates
for samples of workers with less than high school education, high school-educated
employees and workers who attended tertiary education, respectively. The estimates
of the elasticity of the portable earnings capacities to ﬁrm idiosyncratic and sectoral
37productivity are very close to zero, in particular those relative to idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity, and non-statistically signiﬁcant. When we split the sample according to
observable skills, we see a tendency toward negative assortative matching in response
to sector-speciﬁc productivity in the group with the lowest skills.32 All estimates
related to idiosyncratic productivity are tiny and non-diﬀerent from zero at standard
levels of testing. We have also experimented with productivity lags in this speciﬁca-
tion, but the eﬀects remain insigniﬁcant and small. Overall, the analysis therefore
suggests that the skill composition of workers within a ﬁrm is largely unaﬀected by
changes in both sectoral and idiosyncratic productivity.
4.8 Measurement issues
In the main text, we have stressed the importance of using the right price measures
to deﬂate output in the main text. Following our discussion in Section 2.2.2, wage
shocks will transmit into measured real output series if sectoral prices are used when
deﬂating sales to obtain real output, generating a positive bias in the estimated
impact of idiosyncratic productivity. This conjecture is conﬁrmed by the results
presented in Table 8. The ﬁrst column replicates our baseline results for the sake
of comparison. In column 2, we use 3-digit PPI deﬂators instead of ﬁrm-level prices
to derive gross output. Using sectoral deﬂators results in an estimated elasticity of
idiosyncratic productivity of almost twice the size (0092) of the benchmark. Two-
32Interestingly, these estimates are in line with the conclusions in Abowd, Kramarz, Perez-Duarte,
and Schmutte (2010), who estimate a structural job assignment model with coordination frictions.
They ﬁnd that low ability workers have a comparative advantage in highly productive ﬁrms within
manufacturing, but that the empirical inﬂuence of sorting is minor because of limited heterogeneity.
For results that instead pointing toward positive assortative matching and further references, see
Mendes, Van Den Berg, and Lindeboom (2010).
38sided tests show that this diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
As a second experiment, we show the impact of using a measure of value-added
instead of gross output to derive the productivity and technology series.33 As dis-
cussed in Section 2.2.2, the main problem with value—added based measures of TFP
is that they will be negatively correlated with the intensity of the use of primary
inputs, including labor, if there are decreasing returns to scale. Column 3 of Ta-
ble 8 presents the results of using a value-added Solow residual to instrument for
value-added labor productivity.34 We see that the value-added estimates are con-
siderably smaller than those based on TFP, as expected if demand shocks have a
positive impact on wages. The negative bias is somewhat larger for the sectoral
elasticity, suggesting that the wage eﬀect of labor demand is more likely to be seen
when demand shocks are shared within sectors
Finally, we have experimented with alternative series of TFP, which are based
on a speciﬁcation derived from estimated capital from book values. This approach
has limitations, but relaxes the assumption of perfect complementarity between
the ﬂow of capital utilization and electricity use we made in our preferred TFP
series. Appendix C.1 provides the details of the construction of the alternative TFP
measures. The estimated elasticities are slightly smaller than those reported in the
main text, but deliver a very similar message.35
33Real value added  is measured as gross output minus intermediary and energy costs deﬂated












∆. Value-added labor productivity is simply obtained as real
value added per employee.
34The value-added calculations require diﬀerent data and give rise to a slightly diﬀerent sample.
We have estimated the baseline model with this restricted sample, obtaining virtually identical
coeﬃcients as those shown in Column 1.
35The resulting sample after the calculation of TFP based on a measure of the capital stock is
39Table 8: The impact of diﬀerent deﬂators and output measures
(1) (2) (3)
IV IV IV
Prices (Productivity) Firm-level 3-digit PPI Firm-level
Prices (TFP) Firm-level 3-digit PPI Firm-level
Output Measure Gross Output Gross Output Value-added

 0.149** 0.112** 0.040*
(0.038) (0.035) (0.017)

 0.051** 0.092** 0.023**
(0.010) (0.016) (0.005)
Worker characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Match ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 472,555 472,555 469,044
Number of Firms 1,136 1,136 1,136
Kleibergen-Paap 44.5 121.6 77.56













Note: * (**) denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 (1) percent level. Standard errors clustered on
ﬁrms reported inside parentheses. All speciﬁcations include time eﬀects and labor market
tightness. Worker characteristics include age, age squared and age cubed. K-P denotes the
Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk LM statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the equation is
underidentiﬁed. P-value denotes the associated p-value for the test. P-value (

) denotes
the associated p-value for a two-sided test of equality of coeﬃcients in the case of sectoral
productivity with respect to the coeﬃcients shown in Column 1. P-value (

) denotes the
associated p-value for a two-sided test of equality of coeﬃcients in the case of idiosyncratic
productivity with respect to the coeﬃc i e n t ss h o w ni nC o l u m n1 .
405C o n c l u s i o n s
We have studied how individual wages are aﬀected by the changes in productivity
of the ﬁrms where the workers are employed. In order to derive the causal impact
of ﬁrm productivity on individual wages we have relied on a carefully constructed
measure of physical total factor productivity as an instrument for measured labor
productivity. Importantly, we use unique data on ﬁrm-level prices and outputs,
which allows us to accurately measure technical change purged of relative price
adjustments in our panel of manufacturing plants. In addition, we have relied on
matched employer-employee data to purge the analysis of sorting on both the supply
a n dd e m a n ds i d e .
We ﬁnd that ﬁrm-level productivity has an impact on workers’ wages, which con-
trasts to simple frictionless competitive models where individual wages only depend
on aggregate labor market conditions and individual skills. Changes in productivity
that are shared within a sector have a 3 times larger impact on wages than purely
idiosyncratic innovations. The long-run impact of both types of shocks is about
twice as large as the short run impact, but the relative importance is the same. The
results therefore suggest that both workers and ﬁrms beneﬁtf r o mﬁrm-level tech-
nological advancements, but that substantially fewer of the beneﬁts are extracted
by workers if the productivity increases are purely idiosyncratic. However, since the
standard deviation of idiosyncratic (within-match) productivity is about three times
larger than that of sectoral productivity, it plays a similar role in shaping workers’
wage increases: a one standard deviation increase in either sector-speciﬁco ri d i o -
slightly diﬀerent than the sample used in the main text. Hence, for the sake of comparison we
have repeated the analysis also with our preferred TFP series. We ﬁnd an elasticity of 0.042 with
TFP based on capital instead of 0.047 for the idiosyncratic component, and 0.12 for TFP based on
capital instead of 0.15 with our preferred TFP series, in the case of sectoral productivity.
41syncratic productivity has a wage impact amounting to about one quarter (half) of
the average yearly wage growth of incumbent workers in the short (long) run.
Our analysis reveals that systematic sorting of workers is of minor importance
in this context, which suggests that ﬁrms’ recruitment policies largely remain un-
aﬀected by changes in ﬁrm-level productivity. Our results do, however, show that
the use of a properly deﬁned TFP measure is crucial for the identiﬁcation of the
causal impact of labor productivity on individual wages. We show that OLS es-
timates of sectoral productivity are downwardly biased, which is consistent with
wage impacts stemming from demand shocks in the presence of decreasing returns
and upward sloping wage curves. In contrast, demand shocks are expected to yield
an upward bias on estimates of idiosyncratic productivity if the TFP series that
is used to instrument labor productivity is derived from standard measures based
on sector-deﬂated output, rather than output deﬂated using ﬁrm-level prices. Our
empirical exercises are also in line with this theoretical prediction. These ﬁndings,
in turn, suggest an important role for other ﬁrm-level shocks such as idiosyncratic
demand shocks in the determination of individual wages, a feature that deserves
further research.
Overall, the paper provides three important insights for future research on the
relationship between ﬁrm productivity and wages. The ﬁrst is that proper mea-
surement is crucial to understand the relationship between wages and productivity.
Most notably, our estimates suggest that productivity as it is typically measured
is a function of wages through the relative-price component, which remains when
revenues or value-added are deﬂated by sectoral prices. Thus, it is perfectly possible
to ﬁnd links between productivity and wages even if the labor market is perfectly
competitive and ﬁrms produce according to constant returns to scale technologies,
42as long as product markets are imperfect. The second insight is the lack of positive
assortative matching between workers’ earning capacity, as estimated from previous
earnings, and the time-varying productivity of ﬁrms or sectors. Given that the shocks
we analyze appear to be permanent in nature, this result appears to be at odds with
search models featuring two-sided heterogeneity, which predict diﬀerent patterns of
assortative matching (see e.g. the survey by Lentz and Mortensen (2010)). An al-
ternative interpretation is, however, that human resource policies of ﬁrms are quite
rigid, and only reviewed infrequently. Finally, it appears to be clear that changes in
productivity in other ﬁrms within narrowly deﬁned sectors matter more for individ-
ual wages than the changes of ﬁrm-level productivity that are purely idiosyncratic.
If this is due to the importance of collective bargaining above the ﬁrm level, or due
to the quality of outside opportunities in—or poaching oﬀers from—competing ﬁrms
is an interesting question for future research, although tentative estimates presented
in this paper suggest a role for both.
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48Appendices:
A Wage setting institutions in Sweden
This Appendix discusses wage-setting institutions in Sweden.36 The Swedish model of wage
determination is typically associated with centralized wage bargaining and wage compres-
sion. Wage negotiations on a nationwide level were implemented in the 1950s and remained
a key feature of Swedish institutions until the early 1980s. The central agreements were
initially laid out by the central blue collar (LO) and the employer confederation (SAF), but
with a gradually increasing role also for white collar unions (TCO and SACO). Interestingly,
one of the key motivations for centralized bargaining was the idea that wages should not
vary between ﬁrms or industries depending on productivity (“equal pay for equal work”).
The theory, which was widely accepted, was that wages should reﬂect diﬀerences between
individuals’ qualiﬁcations, but not ﬁrms’ abilities to pay. On the employer side, the poli-
cies also meant that the most productive ﬁrms were allowed to make large proﬁts without
sharing them with the workers. Central from the unions’ perspective was that this would
lead to the closing of unproductive ﬁrms, but that active labor market policies should help
workers move from low productive parts of the economy into more productive segments.
In that sense the wage policy was highly growth oriented. Importantly, although central
agreements laid out the central principles for wage setting, they were always followed by
negotiations at the industry and ﬁrm levels. Even in the hay-days of central bargaining,
about half of individual wage increases in the industrial sector was "wage drift", i.e. wage
changes above central agreements (Hibbs and Locking (1996)).
Although the model in principle was in favor of wage diﬀerences between workers of
diﬀerent qualiﬁcations, unions had a clear ambition to reduce overall wage diﬀerences. This
led to increasing complaints from the employer side during the late 1970s. Following a few
years of turmoil, the metalworkers’ union signed a separate industry-level agreement with
the employer side in 1983. This was essentially the end of centralized wage bargaining in











Jan‐92 Jan‐93 Jan‐94 Jan‐95 Jan‐96 Jan‐97
Actual wage growth (Blue Collar)
Collective agreements (Blue Collar)
Figure 1: Annual wage growth for blue collar workers in the private sector, actual
and bargained wages. Source: National Mediation Oﬃce.
Sweden, leaving room to a model of industry level bargaining. Importantly, collective ac-
tions in the form of strikes or lock-outs where allowed when negotiating at the industry level
but not at the ﬁrm level. However, occasional illegal strikes and other forms of reduced ef-
fort, e.g., in the form of excessive sickness absence, during ﬁrm-level bargaining suggest that
collective actions may have also played an important role in local bargaining. An exception
to the decentralized bargaining was made in the early 1990s when an economic crisis was
approaching and inﬂation was in double digits. In an eﬀort to curb wage inﬂation and pre-
serve the ﬁxed exchange rate, a government commission coordinated the social partners into
a one-time central agreement (the "Rehnberg agreement")f o rt h ep e r i o d1991−92. Follow-
ing the agreement, Sweden returned to a period of uncoordinated industry-level bargaining.
During the mid 1990s a very generous agreement in the paper-producing sector spurned fears
that wage inﬂation was again becoming a serious threat to macroeconomic stability, and to
the labor market recovery, which was yet to be seen. As a response, white and blue-collar
unions in the industrial sector jointly suggested a new system of coordinated bargaining
where the industry sector jointly bargained ﬁrst, and other sectors followed. This system
50of coordinated industry-level bargaining has remained largely unchanged since its start in
1997.
Our period of study is 1990−96. With the exception of the Rehnberg agreement, this was
a period of uncoordinated industry-level bargaining and ﬁrm-level wage drift. Empirically,
the period coincides with a period of continuous increase in wage dispersion from the mid-
1980s after several decades of wage compression (see e.g. Gustavsson (2006)). As shown
by Nordström Skans, Edin, and Holmlund (2009), the increasing overall wage dispersion
is primarily due to increased wage diﬀerences between ﬁrms (both within and between
industries). The wage dispersion within ﬁrms has remained largely unchanged since the
early 1990s. Figure 1 shows the evolution of negotiated (at the sectoral level) and actual
wage increases during the early 1990s for blue collar workers in the private sector. As the
ﬁgure shows, both components were substantial.
51BD a t a c o n s t r u c t i o n
The ﬁrm data set we use is primarily drawn from the Industry Statistics Survey (IS) and
contains annual information for the years 1990-1996 on inputs and output for all Swedish
manufacturing plants with 10 employees or more and a sample of smaller plants. The data is
matched to RAMS, which adds individual wages and worker characteristics of each employee
of the manufacturing plants included in the sample. Here we focus on continuing plants that
are also a ﬁrm.
When computing labor productivity, labor input,  is measured as the average number
of employees during the year and is taken from the IS. For the Swedish manufacturing sector,
Carlsson (2003) reports that the growth rate of hours per employee is acyclical. Thus, we
are not likely to leave out any important variation in labor input by looking at only the
growth rate of the extensive margin. To compute the input index, ∆e , used to estimate
the returns to scale and change in technology, real intermediate inputs, , are measured
as the sum of costs for intermediate goods and services collected from the IS deﬂated by a
three-digit (SNI92/NACE) producer price index collected by Statistics Sweden. Moreover,
energy,  , is measured as the plants’ electricity consumption in  taken from the IS.
When computing the (overall) cost shares, we also need a measure of the ﬁrms’ labor
cost, which is deﬁned as total labor cost including e.g. payroll taxes available in the IS. Also,
to calculate the cost shares by education in expression (6) as well as the growth rate for
respective category of labor input, we use the RAMS data (see discussion in section 3 above).
Here we deﬁne  (less then high school education) as individuals with a one-digit ISCED
97 level code smaller than or equal to two,  (high school education) as individuals with
a one-digit ISCED 97 level code equal to three and  (tertiary education) as individuals
with a one-digit ISCED 97 level code larger than or equal to four.37 Moreover, since Sweden
experienced a boom bust cycle in the late 80sa n de a r l y90sw ed on o tu s eo b s e r v a t i o n sf r o m
ﬁrms experiencing large losses when calculating the two-digit cost shares. In the calculations
we drop observations for ﬁrms where the (residual) capital share is below −10 percent of
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Figure 2: Distribution of output and input growth rates. Vertical lines indicate
truncation limits.
sales. This procedure gives rise to aggregate manufacturing cost shares that are similar to
those obtained using the data underlying Carlsson (2003).38
Although we have removed obviously erroneous observations, the ﬁrm data set still
contains very large observations in ∆ and ∆e . To avoid our returns to scale estimates
being aﬀected by ﬁrms subject to episodes of extreme conditions, these observations are
removed (see below). In ﬁgure 2, the data distributions are plotted for the relevant variables
for estimating returns to scale and technology change (truncated at ±1 in log-diﬀerence
space).
38The aggregate manufacturing shares in Carlsson (2003) (our sample) equals  =0 65
(066)  =0 25 (020)  =0 07 (012) and  =0 03 (003).
53Since the main mass of the data seems to be well captured in the interval ±06 for all
variables, we limit the data set to contain ﬁrms with observations only within this interval.
Note that e.g.  =0 6 corresponds to an annual increase of 82 percent in real output.39
This procedure removes 160 ﬁrms from the sample leaving us with 1138 ﬁrms.40 In order
to decompose the technology series into a sectoral and an idiosyncratic part we need to drop
two additional ﬁrms since they are the only ﬁrms in the sample pertaining to a particular
sectoral agreement. This then leaves 1136 ﬁrms in the data set we then use to estimate the
speciﬁcation (7).
After merging the ﬁnal ﬁrm-level data with the employee data in RAMS we arrive at
474528 employee observations across 106815 individuals. Removing observations where
education information is missing we have 472555 observation across 106050 individuals
left. This data set covers about 10 percent of the total manufacturing sector employment.
Finally, unemployment and vacancy data on the local labor market level is collected from
the National Labor Market Board (AMS). The data contains information on the number of
registered vacancies and the number of individuals registered as openly unemployed at an
unemployment oﬃce in November. We use the (1993)d e ﬁnition of homogenous local labor
markets constructed by Statistics Sweden using commuting patterns, which divides Sweden
into 109 areas.
39The chosen intervals are slightly more limiting with respect to the distribution for  and .
However, making a small increase in these two intervals yields very similar results, relative to those
p r e s e n t e di nT a b l e s1t o3i nt h em a i nt e x t .
40We do not remove observations with large movements in labor productivity since this variable
will be instrumented in the econometric procedure.
54C The problems with using VA to derive TFP
A standard approach to derive TFP is to rely on value-added as a measure of production.
As we illustrate in this Appendix, the use of value-added in combination with deviations
from non-constant returns will result in a measure of TFP that is not independent from the
use of intermediate inputs and factor input growth.








1 −  − 
(∆ + ∆)
where ∆
 =[ ( ( + ))∆ +( ( + ))∆] is the weighted growth
rate of primary factors and ∆ is the growth rate of real value-added.42 As can be seen
in equation (C1), real value-added will not only depend on primary factors, but also on
materials and energy growth, unless there are constant returns. To see why, one can think
of real value-added as a partial TFP measure subtracting the productive contribution of
materials and energy from real gross output under the assumption of perfect competition
and constant returns. Hence, when constructing a value-added Solow Residual, ∆
 ,
∆
 =(  − 1)∆
 +
∆




1 −  − 
(∆ + ∆)
by subtracting ∆
 from ∆, the resulting measure will also depend on materials and
energy use, unless there is constant returns. We also see that there will be an eﬀect on
the value-added Solow residual working via primary inputs growth through the implied
41See Basu and Fernald (1995) for a full derivation. Note that Basu and Fernald (1995) does not
separate between intermediates and energy as is done here.
42For clarity, we do not substitute ∆ with ∆ here. This is, however, done in the empirical
work.
55( −1)∆
 term in ∆
 . Note, though, that this particular eﬀect (but not the eﬀect
working through intermediate materials and energy growth) would vanish if we allowed for
non-constant returns when computing TFP from value-added data.
Comparing expressions (C1) and (C2), it is easy to see that unless there are constant
returns to scale, or a very special covariance structure across the diﬀerent production factors,
there will be a component in the correlation between (C1) and (C2) that is driven by input
factor growth and not technology growth. To the extent that e.g. demand shocks are
correlated with factor input growth, this type of shock will aﬀect both the instrument as
well as the instrumented variable, giving rise to a bias in the coeﬃcient of labor productivity
on wages.
C.1 Constructing a measure of the capital stock
We calculate the capital stock using investment data and book values (for the starting
values). When using a measure of the capital stock, the input index is deﬁned as ∆e 
 =
∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆. The capital stock, , is computed using
a variation of the perpetual inventory method which utilizes all the information we have
available in the data.
We calculate the capital stock in two steps. In the ﬁrst step we calculate the recursion
 =m a x{(1 − )−1 +  } (C3)
where  is a sector-speciﬁc depreciation rate (two-digit SNI92/NACE) and is computed as
an asset-share weighted average between the depreciation rates of machinery and buildings
(collected from Melander (2009), table 2),  is real net investments in ﬁxed tangible assets
(deﬂated using a two-digit SNI92/NACE sector-speciﬁci n v e s t m e n td e ﬂator collected from
Statistics Sweden) and  is the real book value of ﬁxed tangible assets (computed
using the same deﬂator as for investment) and
0 =
½
0 if 0 is missing,
 otherwise. 
56Since the ﬁrm has an incentive to keep the book values low for tax reasons, we use the book






where the ending point of the ﬁrst recursion, ,i su s e da st h es t a r t i n gp o i n tf o rt h e
backward recursion. This is done in order to maximize the quality of the capital stock series
given that we do not have a very reliable starting point and the time-series dimension is
not very long. Taking account for missing data when calculating the capital stock, we can
project the technology levels for 944 ﬁrms using ∆e 
 instead of ∆e .
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